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The removal of barriers
to interstate expansion and
the need for competitive size
in banking have increased
banks’ incentives to create
banking institutions that
stretch across multiple
states through merger or
acquisition. This merger and
acquisition activity has
increased the focus on bank
valuation. Potential bank
merger targets could strive
to develop specific
characteristics either to hold
off acquiring banks or to
command a good price from
acquiring banks.
One way to either hold
off mergers and acquisitions
or command a good price
from acquiring banks is by
increasing size. Another way
would be to increase
profitability (Edwards,
1986). Size and profitability
are the two most important
variables in bank valuation
models. 
Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB)
standards are intended to
minimize the ability of
management to manipulate
earnings. Despite these
standards, the Security and
Exchange Commission
(SEC) questions whether the
financial statements reflect
the economics of the
merger. Therefore, the SEC
would be interested in
whether merged banks
manipulate earnings just
before the merger. In
addition, the Federal
Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) uses the
Capital Adequacy Ratio
(shareholders’ equity plus
loan loss reserves to total
assets plus loan loss
reserves) as one of its
criteria for authorizing
mergers. Generally,
increasing earnings by a
reduction of the loan loss
provision results in a
reduction in capital. This
also implies that an increase
in the loan loss provision
increases regulatory capital. 
Managers of banks with
low regulatory capital have
incentives to increase the
loan loss provision (Moyer,
1990). In addition, Ahmed,
Takeda,  and Thomas 
(1999) found that capital
management is an
important determinant of
the loan loss provision.
Annual reports identify the
loan loss reserve as a
subjective determination of
loan losses (Cortland
Bancorp, 1999). Therefore,
the FDIC would be
interested in whether
managers are manipulating
the loan loss provision to
manage regulatory capital.
The purpose of this
study is to test whether
merged1 banks have
previously been engaged in
earnings management using
an Industry Specific Model.
This article uses the model
to empirically test for
earnings management in the
three years prior to the
merger.2 In addition, the
article compares the
Industry Specific Model with
the Modified Jones Model in
its ability to detect earnings
management. This research
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differs from prior research
in that most other earnings
management studies used
manufacturing samples or
non-merged bank samples
in their studies (Key, 1997).
Key (1997) tested a variation
of the Modified Jones Model
on a service, cable TV. The
article uses the Industry
Specific Model to test for
earnings management in a
specific industry such as
financial institutions and
found that merged banks
overall manage earnings in
all three years. The
magnitude of earnings
management increases in
the two years prior to the
merger in comparison to
Year -3 indicating that
controls do not have an
effect on minimizing
earnings management. The
results show that the
Industry Specific Model is
the better model to detect
earnings management. In
addition, sensitivity tests
conclude that merged
national banks are driving
the results of the full
sample, i.e., merged
national banks have an
increasing magnitude of
earnings management as
the merger approaches
while merged state banks
have a decreasing
magnitude of earnings
management as the merger
approaches.
Literature Review
In early accrual studies,
several studies (Healy,
1985; DeAngelo, 1986;
1988; Liberty & Zimmer-
man, 1986) examined the
effects of events on
management’s manipulation
of accounting accruals in
multi-industry manu-
facturing. These studies
provided mixed results for
event studies indicating that
accrual methodology may
not have been powerful
enough to detect earnings
management.
The results of these
methodology studies on
multi-industry samples lead
to testing of the Modified
Jones Model on specific
industry samples, such as
Cahan, Chavis, and
Elemendorf (1997) and Key
(1997), who tested their
models on specific industry
samples such as chemicals
and cable TV, respectively.
These two empirical studies
reported the existence of
earnings management using
the Modified Jones Model
methodology. The results in
these specific industry
sample studies were
stronger than results from
early accrual studies and
multi-industry sample
studies.
Ten studies, Barth,
Beaver, and Wolfson (1990);
Barth (1994); Scholes,
Wilson, and Wolfson (1990);
Warfield and Linsmeier
(1992); Collins, Shackelford,
and Wahlen (1995); Beatty,
Chamberlain, and Magliolo
(1995); Moyer (1990); Chen
and Daley (1996); Robb
(1998); and Ahmed et al.
(1999), used a sample of
non-merged banks to test
earnings management.
These studies tested a single
explanatory variable’s
association with earnings
management. Five studies
examined the use of realized
security gains and losses to
manage earnings. Four of
the studies, Barth et
al.(1990); Barth (1994);
Scholes et al. (1990); and
Warfield and Linsmeier
(1992), concluded that
security gains and losses
are used to manage
earnings. Collins et al.
(1995) found that security
gains and losses were not
used to manage earnings.
Beatty et al. (1995) found
that pension settlement
gains and miscellaneous
gains and losses from asset
sales were used to manage
earnings. Five studies
(Moyer, 1990; Collins et al.,
1995; Chen & Daley, 1996;
Robb, 1998; Ahmed et al.,
(1999) tested the association
between the loan loss
provision and earnings
management. All the studies
except Chen and Daley
(1996) and Ahmed et al.
(1999) found evidence that
the loan loss provision was
used to manage earnings.
Chen and Daley (1996)
found no evidence of
earnings management in the
Canadian banking industry.
Ahmed et al. (1999) found
no evidence of earnings
management after the 1990
capital regulatory rules
change.
Most of the recent
studies using samples of
banks have used foreign
samples of banks; however,
four studies used the U.S.
banking industry in their
samples. In Beatty et al
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(2002), samples of public
and private holding
companies were used to
examine whether public
bank small earnings
increases relative to small
earnings decreases was
attributable to earnings
management. Results show
that public banks report
fewer small earnings
decreases in comparison to
private banks. In addition,
public banks are more likely
to use the loan loss
provision and security gain
realizations to eliminate
small earnings decreases.
Kanagaretnam, Krishnan,
and Lobo (2010) found that
unexpected auditor fees are
unrelated to earnings
management for large
banks. For small banks,
they found greater earnings
management via the loan
loss provision by banks that
pay higher unexpected total
and non-audit fees to the
auditor. Cheng (2011) found
that bank managers with
high equity incentives are
more likely to manage
earnings but only when
capital ratios are closer to
the minimums required by
regulators. Interestingly,
this finding indicates that
potential regulatory
intervention in the banking
industry induces, rather
than mitigates, earnings
management arising from
equity incentives. In
Leventis and Dimitropoulos
(2012), the findings suggest
that efficient corporate
governance mechanisms
report small positive income
to a lesser extent than
banks with weak
governance efficiency. The
study also indicated that
well-governed banks engage
less in aggressive earnings
management behavior
through the use of
discretionary loan loss
provisions and realized
security gains and losses. 
Background
Bank Regulation
Banks are regulated
based upon two groups:
state and federal. The
comptroller of the currency
issues a federal charter
(national bank). A bank with
a state charter is referred to
as a state bank. All national
banks must belong to the
Federal Reserve and be
insured by the FDIC.
Therefore, the comptroller of
the currency, the Federal
Reserve, and the FDIC
regulate national banks.
State banks can elect to be
members of the Federal
Reserve. Therefore, state
banks are regulated by the
appropriate state agency,
Federal Reserve (if member),
and FDIC. The Federal
Reserve, FDIC, and state
agencies apply the same
regulatory procedures. A
bank is rated one to five
with one being outstanding
and five very poor. A
composite rating of the five
characteristics is deter-
mined. Banks with a mean
rating of 4.0 or higher are
considered problem banks
(Madura 1998).
Incentives to Manage
Earnings
Two competing
explanations can be
provided for bank managers
having an incentive to
manage earnings. As a bank
approaches candidacy for
merger, bank managers
have an incentive to
increase earnings. Inflating
earnings will bring higher
returns to shareholders
(Schipper, 1989), and a
bank will become a more
attractive merger target. In
addition, a manager of a
merger target may have an
incentive to inflate earnings
to convince shareholders of
acquiring banks they are
operating efficiently. It is
also possible that managers
have an incentive to
increase earnings to prevent
mergers. In other words,
some target banks may
drive their values up such
that a purchasing bank
does not have the resources
to acquire them (Easter-
wood, 1997). Positive t-
statistics and positive
discretionary accruals
would be evidence of this
incentive.
On the other hand, as a
bank approaches candidacy
for merger, bank managers
have an incentive to lower
earnings. Bank managers
may wish to manipulate
earnings by lowering
accruals just prior to the
merger to increase returns
for the acquiring company
in the year after the merger.
This behavior is based upon
the “big bath” theory (Zucca
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& Campbell, 1992; Porciau,
1993). In addition, bank
managers may want to
make the bank unattractive
such that the purchasing
bank would not be
interested in the target
bank. Negative t-statistics
and negative discretionary
accruals would be evidence
of this incentive. 
The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation uses
the Capital Adequacy Ratio
(shareholders’ equity plus
loan loss reserves to total
assets plus loan loss
reserves) as one of its
criteria for authorizing
mergers. Generally,
earnings increases are
caused by a reduction of the
loan loss provision resulting
in a greater reduction in
regulatory capital. This
implies that an increase in
the loan loss provision
reducing earnings increases
regulatory capital.
Therefore, managers of
banks with low regulatory
capital have incentives to
increase the loan loss
provision (Moyer, 1990).
Ahmed et al. (1999) found
that capital management is
an important determinant of
the loan loss provision.
Annual reports identify the
loss reserve as a subjective
determination of loan losses
(Cortland Bancorp, 1999). A
bank can be denied a
request to merge because of
an inadequate capital
adequacy ratio. Capital
adequacy is an important
consideration in the merger
approval process and
regulators are thought to
impose higher regulatory
capital standards for banks
that are actively involved in
merger activity (Ahmed et
al., 1999). Regulators can
increase the regulatory
costs incurred by a bank for
not complying with the
capital guidelines. For
example, a noncomplying
bank can be examined more
often. Therefore, bank
merger targets have an
incentive to manage
earnings lower through the
manipulation of the loan
loss reserve. Institutions
undertaking merger
transactions must file an
application with the FDIC,
which does not approve
proposed mergers in which
the resulting institution
would fail to meet existing
capital standards or whose
earnings prospects, both in
terms of quantity and
quality, are weak, suspect,
or doubtful. In assessing
capital adequacy and
earnings prospects,
particular attention is paid
to the adequacy of the
allowance for loan losses
(FDIC, 1998). Therefore,
mergers in which the target
bank(s) would cause the
resulting institution to fail
to meet capital standards or
cause earnings prospects to
be weak, suspect, or
doubtful would not be
approved. Incentives thus
exist, at least theoretically,
for bank managers to
manipulate earnings prior to
mergers. A priori, the
direction of the manipula-
tion cannot be specified for
a bank since the direction of
the manipulation depends
upon which incentive
predominates. Regardless,
this research is seeking to
determine if earnings
management has occurred.
Research Design
Sample and Data Collection
A sample of merged or
acquired banks was selected
from a population of all
banks listed in the 1995
and 1997 Compustat
Merged Industrial Annual
Data Files under Banking,
Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) Code
602. The 602 SIC code
includes three categories of
banks: national commercial
banks, (6021), state
commercial banks (6022),
and commercial banks other
(6029). Other studies (Key,
1997; Cahan et al., 1997)
used various time periods in
their research design. Key
(1997) used 12 years to test
earnings management in the
cable television industry. 
Cahan et al. (1997) used 14
years to test a sample of
chemical firms. The number
of years of data in this study
is limited to 13 to be
consistent with these prior
studies and to avoid losing
additional banks. Two
methodology papers (Jeter &
Shivakumar, 1999; Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995)
on earnings management
acknowledge reliable
parameter estimates using
periods of this length.The
Compustat Merged
Industrial Annual Data Files
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contain a population of 204
banks merged in the 1989-
1997 time period. Data were
collected on each variable
for the most recent 13 years
prior to the merger during
the period 1975-1997. The
population of 204 was
reduced by excluding banks
(153) with less than 13
years of data. This leaves 51
banks that meet data
requirements in Compustat.
Moody’s Bank and Finance
Manual was used to search
for data missing from
Compustat. Of the 153
banks that had missing
data in Compustat, 34
banks could be found in
Moody’s Bank and Finance
Manual. A search for data
on these 34 banks in
Moody’s Bank and Finance
Manual uncovered 15 banks
with missing data, resulting
in an additional 19 banks
meeting data requirements.
Therefore, this study used
70 banks in the empirical
tests. This information is
presented in Table 1, Panel
A. Table 1, Panel B, shows
the number of mergers
based upon years tested.
The highest number of
mergers, 38 (54%) occurred
in 1991, 1992, and 1995. In
1995, 18 (26%) of the
mergers occurred.
Some banks became
targets earlier than the
actual merger year as
indicated in Compustat.
Thus, banks with
announcement years earlier
than the merger year as
indicated in Compustat
have incentives to manage
earnings earlier than the
merger year. The
announcement year
represents the date the
bank first announced the
possibility of a merger,
which may be different than
the actual merger year
indicated in Compustat. The
year used as the pre-merger
year in the empirical tests is
based upon the
announcement date rather
than the assumed merger
year in Compustat if the
announcement date
indicates a different pre-
merger year. In seven out of
70 banks, the announce-
ment dates were different
than the merger years
indicated in Compustat.
Therefore, seven banks had
announcement dates that
lead to different testing
periods than a testing
period based upon the
actual merger year. In these
seven cases, the
announcement date was
used to set the pre-merger
year for empirical tests to
allow for an earlier incentive
to manage earnings were
being compared. The fields
in the Merged Industrial
Annual Data file were
converted to the Compustat
Bank Annual File fields
through the Compustat
conversion feature. To be
included in the sample, a
bank must have the
following characteristics:
1. Compustat information
is available for the bank.
2. Compustat classifies the
bank in the 602
standard industrial
classification code.
3. Merger information is
available.
4. Moody’s Bank and
Finance Manual contains
needed information not
in Compustat.
Since the banks in my
sample are organizations,
which cease to exist as
separate entities, the
resulting combination is
defined as either a merger
or consolidation. In a
merger, only one of the
affiliates remains in exis-
tence. A consolidation forms
a new legal entity in which
none of the predecessor
affiliates remains in
existence (Griffin, 1991).
The sample includes banks
that have ceased to exist.
These banks had merger
and consolidation activity
before being merged or
consolidated themselves.
Therefore, the values in
Compustat and Moody’s
Bank and Finance Manual
reflect the prior merger and
consolidation activity of the
merged or consolidated
bank regardless of whether
purchase or pooling was
used.
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Table 1
Sample of Banks
PANEL A: BANKS IN SAMPLE
COMPUSTAT
Total Number of Merged banks in 1989-1997 (Population) 204
Banks Omitted because of Missing data in Compustat 153
Banks with 13 years of data in Compustat 51
MOODY’S BANK AND FINANCE MANUAL
Banks omitted in Compustat, but listed in Moody’s Bank and Finance Manual
34
Banks omitted from sample because of missing data 15
Additional banks with 13 years of data 19
TOTAL BANKS IN SAMPLE 70
PANEL B: MERGERS GROUPED BY YEARS TESTED
1989 4
1990 0
1991 8
1992 12
1993 4
1994 8
1995 18
1996 7
1997 9
TOTAL MERGED BANKS 70
Hypotheses
Bank managers of
merger targets can be
motivated to manage
earnings in either direction.
As stated in the incentives,
the higher the earnings of a
merger target the higher the
price paid to merge or
acquire that target. The
higher earnings is also a
signal to acquiring banks
that the bank is operating
efficiently (Easterwood,
1997). In addition, inflating
earnings will bring higher
returns for shareholders
(Schipper, 1989). Therefore,
inflating earnings might be
evidenced by positive t-
statistics and positive
discretionary accruals.
Another possible explana-
tion for earnings
management in bank
merger targets is the
adjustment of assets (loans)
through repackaging or less
risky lending to lower the
capital adequacy
requirement. This has the
effect of lowering the risk-
weighted assets and the
reserve, which raises
earnings. Thus, bank
managers may be motivated
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to apply income-increasing
discretionary accruals to
manage earnings.
On the other hand, bank
managers may be motivated
to report lower earnings just
prior to the merger (big bath
theory) to increase the
likelihood of better returns
for the acquiring company
in the year after the merger
(Zucca & Campbell, 1992;
Porciau, 1993). This makes
the bank look unattractive
and signals that the bank is
operating inefficiently.
Generally, a greater
reduction of capital
increases earnings due to a
reduction of the loan loss
provision. This implies that
an increase in the loan loss
provision reduces earnings
and increases a bank’s
regulatory capital.
Therefore, managers of
banks with low regulatory
capital have incentives to
increase the loan loss
provision lowering earnings
(Moyer, 1990). Since
earnings can be
manipulated in either
direction, a two-tailed test
was used to test the
hypotheses. Therefore, this
study tested the following
hypothesis stated in the null
form:
H1: Managers of bank
merger targets do not
manipulate reported
earnings in the pre-
merger year. 
Initially, stock-holders of
each company must approve
the merger. After the
stockholders approve the
merger, the institutions
must file an application with
the FDIC. The FDIC does
not approve proposed
mergers where the resulting
institution would fail to
meet existing capital
standards or whose
earnings prospects, both in
terms of quantity and
quality, are weak, suspect,
or doubtful (FDIC, 1998).
Therefore, the FDIC’s
approval process takes time,
and a lag effect occurs
between the time the bank
initially becomes a merger
target and when the merger
is completed. This lag effect
may actually mean that the
merger is submitted for
stockholder approval and/or
regulatory approval in the
pre-merger year or year
prior to the pre-merger year
(Year -2). In this event, any
earnings management
would have taken place
before stockholder approval
or regulatory approval.
Therefore, if the merger
were submitted for
stockholder approval or
regulatory approval in the
pre-merger year, it is
hypothesized that earnings
management would have
occurred in the year prior to
the pre-merger year (Year -
2). In addition, if the merger
were submitted for
stockholder approval or
regulatory approval in the
year prior to the pre-merger
(Year -2), it is hypothesized
that earnings management
would have occurred in Year
-3. This leads to the second
and third hypotheses stated
in the null form.
H2: Managers of bank
merger targets do not
manipulate reported
earnings in the year
prior to the pre-merger
year.
H3: Managers of bank
merger targets do not
manipulate reported
earnings in the third
year prior to the merger.
Industry Specific Model 
One study (Bernard &
Skinner, 1996) discussed
the possibility that the
Jones Model (Jones, 1991)
and the Modified Jones
Model (Dechow et al., 1995)
are misspecified. In both the
Jones and Modified Jones
Models, success is based
upon separating total
accruals into
nondiscretionary and
discretionary components.
Inaccurate measurement of
discretionary accruals
lowers the power of the
research design and may
lead the researcher to
conclude that earnings
management exists when it
may not (Bernard &
Skinner, 1996). They
suggest testing earnings
management in industry
specific settings such as
merged banks, the sample
of this study. They also
suggest reclassifying
misclassified discretionary
accruals as nondiscre-
tionary and reclassifying
misclassified nondiscre-
tionary accruals as
discretionary. Both
suggestions are employed in
developing an Industry
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Specific Model to overcome
mismeasurement error. By
definition, discretionary
accruals include all accruals
not included in the
nondiscretionary accrual
measure. Therefore, some
potential discretionary
accruals should be
nondiscretionary and
potential nondiscretionary
accruals should be
discretionary. For example,
the Modified Jones Model
classifies the timing of
payables and payroll factors
as discretionary when they
might be nondiscretionary.
Many bank studies
(Moyer, 1990: Collins et al.,
1995: Chen & Daley, 1996:
Robb, 1998) have found that
managers use the loan loss
allowance to manipulate
earnings. The loan loss
allowance is increased by
the provision for loan losses
and decreased by charge-
offs. In many cases, one of
the banks’ largest expenses
is the provision for loan
losses. A model that is
better specified might move
the change in receivables
from the nondiscretionary
measure in the Modified
Jones Model to
discretionary accruals in the
Industry Specific Model. 
It is known that the
market interest rate is
determined by factors that
control the supply of and
demand for loanable funds.
Demand for funds comes
from households, business,
government, and foreign
sources. Supply of funds is
provided by savers and
monetary policy imple-
mented by the Federal
Reserve System. Therefore,
the equilibrium interest rate
changes over time because
of changes in demand and
supply of loanable funds.
Therefore, a bank’s interest
revenues and interest
expenses are set by market
forces (Madura, 1998). This
implies that a bank’s
interest revenues and
interest expenses are
nondiscretionary in nature.
The Modified Jones Model
uses the change in all
revenues including interest
revenues in the nondiscre-
tionary specification. The
other revenues including
gains and losses have been
shown by other studies to
be manipulated by
management through the
timing of sales. Therefore,
the Industry Specific Model
should include interest
revenues and interest
expenses in the nondiscre-
tionary specification of the
model. In addition, the other
revenues, including the
gains and losses should, be
included in the
discretionary accruals.
It is also known that
personnel expenses are a
major component of total
costs in a service industry.
One factor that a buyer may
review is the seller’s future
earnings stream. A number
of steps can be taken to
improve the target’s
earnings stream. One of
these steps is to reduce
overhead expenses (Skaggs,
1988). In a bank, non-
interest operating expenses
represent overhead costs.
One of the major com-
ponents of non-interest
operating expenses is
salaries and benefits.
Generally, the labor market
sets salaries and benefits
implying that a bank’s labor
requirements are less
flexible. In addition,
reduction of the non-
interest operating expenses
is based upon cost-cutting
programs and industry
consolidation (Davidson,
1995). Based upon these
reasons, it appears that
non-interest operating
expenses are not a
significant factor in the
discretionary component of
the model. In the Modified
Jones Model, these costs are
included in the
discretionary accrual
specification. It is possible
that these costs are better
specified as non-
discretionary. The Modified
Jones Model with the
partitioning variable can be
adjusted to reflect bank-
specific conditions.
Therefore, the current study
used the following Bank
Specific Model to test for
earnings management in
bank merger targets:
(3) TAit/Ait-1 = β0i(1/Ait-1) +β1i[(ΔINTREVit -ΔINTEXPit)/Ait-1]+β2i(PPEit/Ait-1) +β3i(ΔPERSit/Ait-1) +β4iPARTi + εit
where: 
TAit = total accruals for
bank i3
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Ai,t-1 = assets for bank i
at time t-1.
ΔINTREVit
= the change in
interest
revenues for
bank i4
ΔINTEXPit
= the change in
interest
expenses for
bank i5
PPEit = property, plant,
and equipment
for bank i at time
t
ΔPERSit = the change in
noninterest
operating
expenses for
bank i6
PARTi = 1 if
observation is
from the
event period
0 if the
observation is
from the
estimation
period
εi = error term for
bank i. 
This specification for a
Bank Specific Model
effectively models all
measures found to manage
earnings in other bank
earnings management
studies as discretionary.
These measures include the
loan loss allowance (Moyer,
1990; Collins et al., 1995;
Robb, 1998), security gains
and losses (Barth et al.,
1990; Scholes et al., 1990;
Warfield & Linsemier, 1992),
pension settlement gains
(Beatty et al., 1995), and
miscellaneous gains and
losses from asset sales
(Beatty et al., 1995).
Partitioning Variable 
The discretionary
accruals are embedded in
the error term. The error
term or residuals contain all
other factors not included in
the NDA. A partitioning
variable (PART) is used to
separate the event period
from the estimation period.
PART is an indicator
variable equal to 1 in the
year in which earnings
management is
hypothesized to occur in
response to the stimulus
identified by the researcher
and 0 in the other years.
The PART variable compares
total accruals in the event
year to total accruals in
other years. Dechow et al.
(1995) showed that total
accruals measures
discretionary accruals.
Therefore, the PART variable
measures discretionary
accruals in the event year in
comparison to discretionary
accruals in the other years.
Ordinary least squares
regression is estimated on a
firm-specific basis
producing a t-statistic on
the dummy variable (PART).
According to two studies
(Dechow et al., 1995; Key,
1997), earnings are
managed when the
estimated coefficient on
PART from firm specific
regressions is statistically
significant. 
Therefore, in testing the
hypotheses, a statistically
significant coefficient (β
does not = 0) on PART
indicates that a bank used
discretionary accruals more
in the event year than in the
estimation period to engage
in earnings management.
This study used the
following Z-statistic (Dechow
et al., 1995) to aggregate the
t-statistics cross-sectionally:
Z = 1/ N1/2 ΣNj=1 tj/[kj/(kj-2)]1/2 
where
 
tj = t-statistic for bank j,
and 
kj = degrees of freedom
for t-statistic of bank
j, and
N = number of firms
 
Dechow et al. (1995) used a
sample of 32 firms alleged
by the SEC to have manipu-
lated earnings over a period
of 1982–1992. The 32 firms
had varying event periods
between 1982 and 1992.
This study has 70 banks
with varying event periods
between1989–1997. An
aggregate Z-statistic was
used to test the Modified
Jones Model over varying
event periods. Theoretically,
this was possible because
the exact same 70 firms
were used.
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Results
Influential observations
are those that appear to
have a large influence on
the parameter estimates
(Belsley, 1980). According to
Belsley, influential
observations can be
determined through various
diagnostic tests including
tests of DFFITS and
RSTUDENT (studentized
residuals). These influential
observation tests reduced
the sample to 63
observations for the
empirical tests. 
Sample statistics for the
Industry Specific Model are
reported in Table 2. All
event years tested in the
study are presented. The
number of positive and
negative t-statistics for the
dummy variable (PART), the
number of positive and
negative discretionary
accruals, z-statistic for the
full sample, and the mean
Durbin-Watson statistic are
reported.
In general, the error
term, or residual, contains
all accrual items not
included in the non-
discretionary accrual
specification. Therefore, the
error term or residual
indicates the sign of the
discretionary accrual in
each year tested. A negative
sign would show that banks
are using income-decreasing
discretionary accruals in the
event year. A positive sign
would show that banks are
using income-increasing
discretionary accruals in the
event year. The number of
positive and negative
dummy variable (PART) t-
statistics indicates the
number of banks using
higher or lower
discretionary accruals in the
event years (pre-merger
year, year prior to the pre-
merger year or Year -3) in
comparison to the other
years. The Z-statistic
measures the significance of
H1 (no earnings
management in the pre-
merger year), H2 (no
earnings management in the
year prior to the pre-merger
year) and H3 (no earnings
management in Year -3). 
Pre-Merger Year
Thirty-six (56.4%)
merged banks had positive
discretionary accruals after
the removal of outliers
indicating that a majority of
merged banks managed
earnings higher in the pre-
merger year. A majority (37,
57.8%) of merged banks had
positive t-statistics on the
PART variable indicating
that a majority of merged
banks managed earnings
higher in the pre-merger
year compared to other
years. The Z-statistic is 5.06
and significant at 1 percent.
Therefore, the null
hypothesis that merged
banks do not manage
earnings is rejected
indicating that merged
banks manage earnings in
the pre-merger year. The
Durbin-Watson statistic is
within a reasonable range
indicating that
multicollinearty is not a
factor. Results are
presented in Table 2.
Year Prior to the Pre-
Merger Year (Year -2)
The 41 (64.1%) positive
discretionary accruals
indicate that merged banks
managed earnings higher in
the year prior to the pre-
merger year. In addition,
merged banks had more
positive t-statistics (39,
60.1%) indicating that
merged banks have
managing earning higher in
the year prior to the pre-
merger year compared to
other years. The Z-statistic
is 5.21 and significant at 1
percent. Therefore, the null
hypothesis that merged
banks do not manage
earnings in the year prior to
the pre-merger year is
rejected indicating that
merged banks manage
earnings in the year prior to
the pre-merger year. The
Durbin-Watson statistic
(2.07) is within a reasonable
range indicating that
multicollinearty is not a
factor. Results appear in
Table 2.
Year -3
The discretionary
accrual in Year -3 are more
positive (42, 68.9%) than
negative. This indicates that
merged banks managed
earnings higher in Year -3.
The t-statistics on the PART
variable are slightly more
negative (33, 54.1%) than
positive indicating that
merged banks managed
earnings slightly lower in
Year -3.compared to the
other years. The Z-statistic
is 4.66 and significant at 1
percent. Therefore, the
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TABLE 2 
Industry Specific Modela 
Sample Statisticsb
 
YEAR -1c -2d -3
t-STATISTICSe (Positive:negative) 37:27 39:25 34:36
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALf (Positive:Negative) 36:28 41:23 42:19
z-STATISTIC 5.06g 5.21g 4.66g
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (Mean) 2.15 2.07 2.10
a. TAit = β0i + β1i(ΔINTREVit - ΔINTEXPit) + β2iPPEit + β3iΔPERSit + β4iPARTi + εit
where 
TA = total accruals; ΔINTREV = interest revenue in time period t minus interest
revenue in time period t-1; ΔINTEXP = interest expense in time period t minus
interest expense in time period t-1; PPE = property, plant, and equipment;
ΔPERS= non-interest operating expenses in time period t minus non-interest
operating expenses in time period t-1; PART=1 in the event year, 0 otherwise. All
variables except PART are scaled by lagged assets.
a. Z-statistic = 1/N1/2 ΣNj=1 tj /[kj /(kj-2)]1/2 
b. 63 banks in sample
c. Pre-merger year
d. Year prior to pre-merger year.
e. t-statistics on dummy variable PART
f. Error term or residual
g. Significantly different than 0 at the 1% level (2-tailed test)
h. N=12 
results indicate that the null
hypothesis of no earnings
management in Year -3 is
negative. This leads to the
conclusion that merged
banks managed earnings in
Year -3. Again, as in the
other two years, the Durbin-
Watson statistic (2.10) is
within a reasonable range,
indicating multicollinearty is
not a factor. Results appear
in Table 2.
The results in all three
years support the incentives
that drive earnings higher in
merged banks. Some of
these incentives include
increasing returns to
shareholders, making the
bank look attractive to
potential buyers in terms of
operating efficiency, and
pricing the bank too high to
avoid a takeover. Another
possible explanation for the
earnings management is
capital ratio manipulation.
The capital adequacy ratio is
an important ratio reviewed
by regulators in a banks
request to merge. An
inadequate capital adequacy
ratio will likely cause the
merger to be denied and
bring a higher number of
bank examinations.
Therefore, a target bank
may be repackaging the
assets to effect a more
favorable capital adequacy
ratio once the merger is
announced. In other words,
repackaging the loans
to lower the loan loss
provision but increase the
capital ratio.
The FDIC authorizes
bank mergers, but does not
approve proposed mergers
in which the resulting
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institution fails to meet
capital standards or the
earnings prospects become
weak, suspect, or doubtful
(FDIC, 1998). Therefore, if
the target bank would cause
the acquiring bank to fail to
meet capital standards or
earnings prospects, the
merger would not be
approved. Regulators can
increase the regulatory
costs for a bank not
complying with capital
guidelines. Thus, a bank
can be examined more often
for noncompliance. This
study found merged banks,
overall, (see Table 2)
managed earnings higher as
the merger year approaches
to meet capital standards,
or managed earnings to
improve earnings prospects
for the acquiring bank just
prior to the merger. In other
words, a bank’s earnings
prospects appeared better
than they, in fact, actually
were.
Sensitivity Analysis
Two sets of sensitivity
tests were applied to the
data. In the first one, Z-
statistics were computed on
Year -4 and Year -5 for
comparison purposes. The
second set of sensitivity
tests included separating
the full sample into state
and national bank com-
ponents. This study
computed separate Z-
statistics for the state and
national banks in each of
the three years tested in the
full sample. The Z-statistic
computed in Year -4 was
4.46. This was slightly lower
than Year -3 indicating that
a higher level of earnings
management was prevalent
in Year -3. Year -5
generated the highest Z-
statistic (5.83) in
comparison to the other
years tested; however, it was
also the furthest year from
the merger year. Z-statistics
for the split sample are
presented in Table 3.
The state and national
samples had Z-statistics in
the pre-merger year of 2.69
and 4.39, respectively,
indicating that the national
sample had a higher level of
earnings management than
the state sample in the pre-
merger year. In the year
prior to the pre-merger year,
the difference in the level of
earnings management was
not significantly different
between state and national
banks. However, the results
from Year -3 indicate that
the state banks (Z = 4.17) 
depict a significantly higher
level of earnings manage-
ment than national banks (Z
= 2.58). 
In the split sample, the
results are mixed. The
results for national banks
have increasing z-statistics
from Year -3 to Year -1. In
fact, the Z-statistic (4.39) for
merged national banks for
the pre-merger year (Year 
-1) is higher than either of
the other two years. The
results indicate that merged
national banks trend toward
a higher magnitude of
earnings management as
the merger approaches. The
merged state sample has
the opposite trend. In fact,
the Z-statistic in Year -3 is
4.17 and decreases to 2.69
in the pre-merger year.
Thus, the trend in merged
state banks is to reduce the
magnitude of earnings
management as the merger
approaches.
It appears that merged
national banks manipulated
earnings as the merger
approaches to look
attractive such that the
acquiring bank or resulting
institution could meet
existing capital standards
and earnings prospects after
the merger. In other words,
a national bank’s capital
standards and earnings
prospects appear good when
in fact they were not. There-
fore, mergers involving
national banks may have
been approved based upon a
misleading level of earnings.
The result that merged
national banks managed
earnings higher as the
merger approaches could
possibly be due to either an
overworked FDIC staff
and/or policies and
procedures that are not
detecting earnings
management. 
On the other hand,
regulatory controls
regarding merged state
banks appears to be deter-
ring earnings management
as the bank gets closer to
the merger. Since merged
state banks are smaller and
have more difficulty meeting
regulatory costs including
more examinations for
noncompliance, it appears
that controls are preventing 
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Table 3
Z-Statisticsa For Stateb And Nationalc Banks
The Industry Specific Modeld
YEAR STATE NATIONAL
-1e 2.69g 4.39
g
-2f 3.68g 3.71g
-3 4.17g 2.58g
a. Z-statistic = 1/N1/2 ΣNj=1 tj /[kj /(kj-2)]1/2 
b. There are 30 State banks in the sample
c. There are 40 National banks in the sample
d. TAit = β0i + β1i(ΔINTREVit - ΔINTEXPit) + β2iPPEit + β3iΔPERSit + β4iPARTi + εit
where 
TA = total accruals; ΔINTREV = interest revenue in time period t minus interest
revenue in time period t-1; ΔINTEXP= interest expense in time period t minus
interest expense in time period t-1; PPE=  property, plant, and equipment;
ΔPERS= non-interest operating expenses in time period t minus non- interest
operating expenses in time period t-1; PART=1 in the event year, 0 otherwise. All
variables except PART are scaled by lagged assets.
e. Pre-merger year
f. Year prior to the pre-merger year
g. Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level (2-tailed test)
an increase in earnings
management as the merged
state bank approaches the
merger. 
Modified Jones Model 
Dechow et al. (1995)
used a Z-statistic to
compare the ability of five
different models to detect
earnings management. The
five models were compared
on a sample of the exact
same thirty-two firms
allowing use of the Z-
statistic to determine the
better model to detect
earnings management. The
coefficient on PART, the
partitioning variable,
represents an estimate of
earnings management. The
Z-statistic is computed by
aggregating the t-statistics
used in a t-test testing the
significance of the coef-
ficient on PART. In their
study, the higher the Z-
statistic the better the
model’s capability to detect
earnings management.
Therefore, the Z-statistic will
be used to compare the
Modified Jones Model and
the Industry Specific Model
in their abilities to detect
earnings management. In
years in which banks are
detected managing
earnings, the higher the Z-
statistic the higher the
magnitude of earnings
management. Therefore, the
model with the higher Z-
statistic would be the better
model for detecting earnings
management in merged
banks.
A comparison of the Z-
statistics between the two
models indicates that the Z-
statistics on the Industry
Specific Model are higher
than the Z-statistics on the
Modified Jones Model (see
Table 4) in all three of the
years tested, indicating that
the Industry Specific Model
appears to detect earnings
management better than the
Modified Jones Model. In
the split sample, the Z-
statistics for the Industry
Specific Model are all higher
than the Z-statistics for the
Jones Model (see Table 5)
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except for national banks in
Year -3. Thus, the
magnitude of earnings
management is higher
based upon the Industry
Specific Model than the
Modified Jones Model in
eight of the nine compari-
sons. This appears to
indicate that the Industry
Specific Model detects
earnings management
better than the Modified
Jones Model. One major
difference between models is
that earnings management
trends lower as the merger
approaches based upon the
modified Jones Model, and
earnings management
trends higher as the merger
approaches based upon the
Industry Specific Model.
Since this study has
concluded that the Industry
Specific Model is the better
model to detect earnings
management based upon
the higher Z-statistics, it
also concludes that earnings
management trends higher
as the merger approaches. 
One explanation for this
result may be that banks
are using different types of 
accruals to manage
earnings in Year -3 than in
Year -2. For example, the
loan loss provision and
gains and losses are a part
of the discretionary accrual
in the Industry Specific
Model while gains and
losses and the loan loss
provision are not a part of
the discretionary accrual in
the Modified Jones Model.
Non-interest operating
expenses also are in the
discretionary accruals in the
Modified Jones Model, but
not in the Industry Specific
Model. Therefore, it is
plausible that banks
managing earnings based
upon the Industry Specific
Model are using the loan
loss provision and gains and
losses to manage earnings
higher in comparison to the
Modified Jones Model.
Public Policy
The data in this study
suggest bank mergers have
been approved based upon
misleading levels of
earnings. This finding
implies that merged banks
may have circumvented the
FDIC’s regulatory controls
for bank mergers. The FDIC
may be interested in
strengthening its review of
the financial statements of
merged banks in general
and specifically merged
national banks in the years
prior to the merger,
especially loans. The
financial statements could
be subjected to a thorough
review for the three years
prior to the merger before
granting a merger request.
An overworked FDIC staff
and/or policies and
procedures that are not set-
up to detect earnings
management could be
reasons that controls are
not presently in place. The
findings suggest that
merged banks may have
circumvented accounting
controls. The SEC might
want to review FAS 72
(Accounting for Certain
Acquisitions of Banking and
Thrift Institutions) and FAS
114 (Accounting by
Creditors for Impairment of
Loans) to strengthen
accounting standards,
especially in terms of assets
and loans, in particular.
Chen and Daley (1996)
found that the loan loss
provision was not used to
manage earnings in Canada.
The Canadian accounting
rules require the loan loss
provision be reported on a
3-year average. FASB
should consider reporting
the loan loss provision on a
3-year average, possibly
eliminating one of the banks
options for managing
earnings.
New Developments
Since this study, efforts
have been made  to increase
regulations to ensure that
future crises in the financial
environment are avoided.
The first comes in the form
of a new financial
accounting standard that
measures all financial
instruments at fair value
(FASB, 2010). The
development of this
financial accounting
standard is in the comments
phase for the standards
ended in May 2013. 
The other regulation, in
the form of Basel III,
increases the capital
requirement to strengthen
the overall financial health
of banks. In 2007, the FASB
issued FAS 159, which  
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Table 4* 
Modified Jones Modela Sample Statisticsb
YEAR -1c -2d -3
t-STATISTICSe (Positive:Negative) 35:28 42:21 23:40
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALf (Positive:Negative) 30:33 23:40 31:32
z-STATISTIC 4.17g 4.29g 4.63g
DURBIN-WATSON STATISTIC (Mean) 2.12 2.01 2.02
*From Table 2 (Meisel, 2007)
a. TAit = β0i + βli(ΔREVit – ΔRECit) + β2iPPEit + β3iPARTi + εit
where
TA = total accruals; ΔREV = revenue in time period t minus revenue in time period t-1;
ΔREC = receivables in time period t minus receivables in period t-1; PPE = property,
plant and equipment; PART = 1 If the year is the event year and 0 otherwise. All
variables except PART are scaled by lagged total assets.
b. 63 banks in sample
c. Pre-merger year
d. Year prior to pre-merger year.
e. t-statistics on dummy variable PART
f. Error term or residual
g. Significantly different than 0 at the the 1% level (2-tailed test)
h. N = 12
Table 5*
Z-statisticsa for Stateb and Nationalc Banks (The Modified Jones Modeld)
YEAR STATE NATIONAL
-1e 2.52g 3.34g
-2f 2.94g 3.16g
-3 3.28g 3.30g
*From Table 3 (Meisel, 2007)
a. Z-statistic = 1/N1/2 ΣNj=1 tj /[kj /(kj-2)]1/2 
b. There are 30 State banks in the sample
c. There are 40 National banks in the sample
d. TAit = β0i + β1i(ΔREVit - ΔRECit) + β2iPPEit + β3iPARTi + εit
where 
TA = total accruals; ΔREV= revenue in time period t minus revenue in time period t-1;
ΔREC = receivables in time period t minus receivables in time period t-1; PPE =  pro-
perty, plant and equipment; PART= 1 If the year is the event year and 0 otherwise.  All
variables except PART are scaled by lagged total assets 
e. Pre-merger year
f. Year prior to the pre-merger year
g. Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level (2-tailed tests)
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required the use of the fair
value option for some
financial instruments
including derivatives and
marketable securities;
however, loans and some
debt security instruments
were not included in this
requirement (Linsmeir,
2011). FASB (2010)
proposes that all financial
instruments be stated at fair
value. Basically, the fair
value approach calls for
reporting of unrealized gains
and losses in reported
earnings. (Linsmeier, 2011).
Basel III is an extension
of Basel I and II. The new
Basel III framework
establishes higher capital
and liquidity regulations to
ensure that banks are better
equipped to absorb losses.
Specifically, the Tier 1
capital requirement
incorporating common
equity and other financial
instruments increases from
4 to 6 percent. (Delimatsis,
2012). 
The FASB tried to
address the problem with
FAS 159; however, it did not
include loans, thus,
allowing managers to
continue managing earnings
higher. The financial
accounting board subtopic
825-10 is proposing to
include all financial
instruments in the fair
value approach.
The results in this study
were compiled with use of
an amortized cost, historical
cost, model. This model
allows manager judgment in
the determination of credit
losses and asset impairment
Thus, managers had the
latitude to underestimate
credit losses and asset
impairments just prior to
the merger to influence the
merger process. In fact,
evidence in this study (Table
2) shows through the t-
statistics and discretionary
accruals that a majority of
merged banks were
managing earnings higher
just prior to the merger. It
appears that the fair value
approach that requires 
fair value accounting in all
financial instruments could
lower the magnitude of
earnings management in
merged banks just prior to
the merger; however, the
motivation to manage
earnings to meet higher
capital ratio benchmarks 
and present higher earnings
prospects would still be
prevalent.
Conclusion
This study extends
earnings management
research by empirically
testing an Industry Specific
Model's ability to detect
earnings management in a
financial institution
environment, specifically
merged banks. Other
studies examined the model
in multi-industry
manufacturing samples.
Two studies (Key, 1997;
Cahan et al., 1997)
examined variations of the
Modified Jones Model in
specific industries such as
the cable TV (a service
industry) and chemical
industries, respectively. The
specific industry models
used in these studies
detected earnings
management in those
industries; however, neither
of these specific industry
studies tested the exact
Modified Jones specification
on those industries.
Previous research tested the
exact Modified Jones Model
adapted to banks on its
ability to detect earnings
management in a financial
environment specifically
merged banks (Meisel,
2007).
The results on the full
sample show that merged
banks had managed
earnings in all three years
tested. That is, banks
managed earnings in the
pre-merger year (Year -1),
year prior to the pre-merger
year (Year -2), and Year -3.
The Z-statistic (4.66) in Year
-3 is lower than the Z-
statistic (5.21) in the year
prior to the pre-merger year
(Year -2) and the Z-statistic
(5.06) in the pre-merger
year (Year -1). This indicates
that the magnitude of
earnings management is
higher in the two years
closest to the merger year.
The results appear to show
that merged banks have
managing earnings higher
as the merger approaches. 
The results indicate that
the discretionary accruals
are mostly positive in all
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three years. This indicates
that merged banks have
managing earnings higher
in all three years; however,
the number of discretionary
accruals in each year is
decreasing as the merger
approaches. The number of
t-statistics on the PART
variable are higher in the
pre-merger year (37) and the
year prior to the pre-merger
year (39) than Year -3,
however. In fact, the
number of negative t-
statistics is higher than
positive t-statistics in Year -
3, indicating that merged
banks have managing
earnings higher in the two
years closest to the merger
than in Year -3.
The limitations may
include a self-selection bias
because the sample
contains only merged
banks. In addition, banks in
the current sample engaged
in merger activity before
they themselves were
acquired or merged. The
numbers collected from
Compustat and Moody's
Bank and Finance Manual
contained accumulated data
including prior merger and
acquisition activity. Since
earnings management is
difficult to measure exactly
using publicly available
data, measurement error is
unavoidable (Barton, 2001).
Even though the Modified
Jones Model is considered a
crude proxy for earnings
management (Healy, 1996),
the use of a one-industry
sample, restricted to merged
banks, mitigates most of the
deficiencies of the model. 
Future research might
test other models that
adjust the nondiscretionary
accruals with different
combinations of variables.
In addition, the sample
could be extended beyond
state and national
commercial banks to
include thrifts. Other
industries such as airlines
and utilities could be
examined for earnings
management.
In summary, the results
show that merged banks
overall are increasing
earnings to reflect higher
returns to shareholders. It
also appears that merged
banks are adjusting assets
(loans) to lower capital
requirements and increase
reported performance.
Regulatory controls of
managed earnings are
working in regards to
merged state banks but not
as well in regards to merged
national banks. Finally, the
Industry Specific Model
appears to be a better model
to detect earnings
management than the
Modified Jones Model.
Endnotes
1. Merged is used in this
article to denote banks
that are no longer
independent regardless
of the legal form (merger
or consolidation) or
accounting method
(purchase or pooling) at
the time of loss of
independence. 
2. The merger year is the
year that the bank
ceased being an
independent entity or
the year before the bank
became a target in
discretionary accrual
methodology studies.
Jones (1991) used a
manufacturing sample
to develop what has
been widely known as
the Jones Earnings
Management Model.
Other studies (Cahan,
1992; Dechow et al.,
1996; Wu, 1997) used
discretionary accrual
models such as the
Jones methodology or
variations of the Jones
Model to test the
association between
earnings management
and event issues on
multi-industry
manufacturing samples.
Methodology studies
(Dechow et al., 1995;
Guay, Kolari, & Watts,
1996; Young, 1999)
evaluated the ability of
discretionary models
(Healy, DeAngelo,
Industry, Jones and
Modified Jones) to detect
earnings management.
All three studies
confirmed that existing
models of discretionary
accruals generate
relatively poor measures
of managerial
accounting choice;
however, of the models
tested, the Modified
Jones Model performed
the best.
3. Total accrual = [change
in current assets -
change in cash] - change
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in current liabilities -
depreciation.
4. Compustat data item
321, includes revenue
received from all earning
assets. 
5. Compustat data item
339, includes interest on
deposits, long-term debt,
and all other
borrowings.
6. Compustat Data Item
42, includes salaries
and wages plus pension
and employee benefits.
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